



Non-admissibility of Cut in
Stoic Logic
Abstract. This paper shows that, for the Hertz–Gentzen Systems of 1933 (without Thin-
ning), extended by a classical rule T1 (from the Stoics) and using certain axioms (also from
the Stoics), all derivations are analytic: every cut formula occurs as a subformula in the
cut’s conclusion. Since the Stoic cut rules are instances of Gentzen’s Cut rule of 1933,
from this we infer the decidability of the propositional logic of the Stoics. We infer the
correctness for this logic of a “relevance criterion” and of two “balance criteria”, and hence
(in contrast to one of Gentzen’s 1933 results) that a particular derivable sequent has no
derivation that is “normal” in the sense that the ﬁrst premiss of each cut is cut-free. We
also infer that Cut is not admissible in the Stoic system, based on the standard Stoic
axioms, the T1 rule and the instances of Cut with just two antecedent formulae in the
ﬁrst premiss.
Keywords: Sequent, Analyticity, Stoic logic, Proof theory, Decidability, Relevance,
Balance, Cut-admissibility.
Introduction and Overview
There is dispute and uncertainty about the exact details of much of the
logic of the Stoics. The primary sources are fragmentary and the secondary
sources fail to provide a coherent account. We ignore the Stoics’ modal logic
and consider only their propositional logic, which may be regarded as a frag-
ment of what we now call classical propositional logic. It is a substructural
logic and a relevant logic, with that term broadly conceived: the rule of
Thinning is neither present nor admissible and an atom-sharing property,
as in [11], i.e. a “relevance criterion”, can be proved, as in Section 8 below.
Stoic deduction is via root-ﬁrst proof search. It is the Stoic view1 that an
argument’s correctness could be established by “analysis” of the argument,
i.e. (in modern terms, following [5]) the root-ﬁrst construction of a proof tree
with the argument as root and axioms as leaves. The main rules of inference
1 We base our claim on two surviving examples of Stoic “analysis” in the work of Sextus
Empiricus, for which see [13, pp. 133–5]. See [1] for details.
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are cut rules. Here, choice of a suitable cut formula is required to ensure
boundedness of the proof search. This is unproblematic in the simple cases
where the ﬁrst premiss of the cut is an axiom, but in general is unclear.
(We are not suggesting that the Stoics used proof trees. In so far as there
are completed Stoic proofs in linear style, their transformation into trees is
unproblematic.)
We have no evidence for a semantics, despite the arguments of authors
such as Milne [8]. Thus, completeness of the proof system w.r.t. a semantics
is not the issue. Decidability is however both pertinent and open.
In this paper we show that, thanks to the Stoics’ speciﬁc choice of ax-
ioms, all derivations are analytic: every cut formula is (or is the negation of)
a subformula of the conclusion of the cut (equivalently, of the derivation).
This limits proof search and we infer decidability. The same meta-theory
also provides us with several criteria for constraining proof search even fur-
ther and allows a proof that Cut (even if the premisses and conclusion are
restricted to being Stoic sequents) is not admissible in the Stoic system.
1. Background on Stoic Logic
We use modern terminology. Since very little of the original Stoic texts sur-
vives, there is no full consensus on details; we refer to [1,2] for presentation
of the relevant material, including assessment of various claims about what
the Stoics did.2
The language is based on Stoic basic propositions, such as “Plato is in
Athens”; we abbreviate all such propositions by the symbols p, q, r etc. These
symbols are not instantiable variables: they are abbreviations. It is implicit
that distinct symbols abbreviate diﬀerent propositions. These are the atomic
formulae or atoms of the language. Thus, wherever we present examples, the
symbols p, q, r, etc are abbreviations for distinct basic propositions.
Upper case Roman letters A, B, etc are used as formula meta-variables.
Compound formulae are built up from atoms using negation ¬, conjunc-
tion ∧, implication→ and exclusive disjunction ⊕. Thus, if A is a formula
then ¬A is a formula; and if also B is a formula, then A ∧ B, A → B and
A ⊕ B are formulae.
Definition 1.1. The contradictory A∗ of a formula A is deﬁned by
(¬B)∗ =def B
2 [1] discusses all published attempts at reconstructing Stoic propositional logic up to
1995. Of more recent contributions, [8,9] deserve mention.
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and otherwise
B∗ =def ¬B.
The sources suggest the possibility of identifying ¬¬A with A: this sim-
pliﬁes the presentation of our results but is not essential. If done, it has the
useful eﬀect that the contradictory A∗ of a formula A is, in every case, just
¬A, since if A is ¬B then ¬A is ¬¬B = B. So we make this identiﬁcation.
But we retain the use of the notion of “contradictory” to match better the
sources.
Stoic logic concerns the correctness of arguments, which we shall call
“sequents”. A sequent has antecedent formulae and a succedent formula, so
is of the form Γ ⇒ A, where Γ is a collection of formulae. We assume that
such a collection is a set, and that combination of such sets, written using a
comma, is set-theoretic union. Our results about analyticity and decidability
are unaﬀected if we assume instead that the Stoics used multisets (and
multiset union). A sequent is Stoic iﬀ it has at least two distinct antecedent
formulae.
Derivations are constructed from axioms using rules of inference as usual.
A sequent is correct if it is the end-sequent of a derivation. The axioms
(called “indemonstrables” by the Stoics) are the instances of metalogical
axiom schemata, of which the Stoics had ﬁve, and which we express as
follows:
A→B,A ⇒ B A1 A→B,B∗ ⇒ A∗ A2
¬(A ∧ B), A ⇒ B∗ A3 ¬(A ∧ B), B ⇒ A∗ A3
′
A ⊕ B,A ⇒ B∗ A4 A ⊕ B,B ⇒ A∗ A4′
A ⊕ B,B∗ ⇒ A A5 A ⊕ B,A∗ ⇒ B A5′
In each axiom schema’s antecedent there is a “principal” formula: it is
that containing the indicated occurrence of a logical connective other than
¬. Thus, in the ﬁrst column, the principal formulae are A→B, ¬(A ∧ B),
A ⊕ B and A ⊕ B respectively.
The Stoic metalogical formulations of their axiom schemata combine A3
and A3′, etc., thus yielding their ﬁve axiom schemata. Note that each axiom
is a Stoic sequent. There are no axioms such as p ⇒ p.
There are four Stoic inference rules, called themata: the rule T1 and three
“cut” rules: T2, T3 and T4. In each case, the rule has a premiss or premisses
above the line and a conclusion below the line.
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Since some of the rules are two-premiss rules, it is convenient to follow
Hertz and Gentzen in drawing proof trees rather than presenting linear
successions of sequents; we do not suggest that this was the Stoic practice.
First, the T1 rule:
Γ, A ⇒ B
Γ, B∗ ⇒ A∗ T1
It is implicit in T1 that neither A nor B∗ is in Γ.
Use of the T1 rule would render four of the above eight axiom schemata
superﬂuous: one in each row. But this would upset the terminology of “ax-
iom”, so we keep all eight of the schemata.
The actual expression by the Stoics was more verbal, as in (for a restricted
version of T1) “When from two [propositions] a third follows, then from
either of them together with the contradictory of the conclusion [i.e. the
succedent] the contradictory of the other follows” [2, p. 111].
Then there are three cut rules: T2, T3 and T4:
A,B ⇒ C C,A, [B] ⇒ D
A,B ⇒ D T2
A,B ⇒ C C,Γ ⇒ D
A,B,Γ ⇒ D T3
A,B ⇒ C C,A, [B],Γ ⇒ D
A,B,Γ ⇒ D T4
where [B] in T2 and in T4 indicates that the occurrence of B is optional.
Note that T2, T3 and T4 have as ﬁrst premiss a restricted form of Stoic
sequent, i.e. one with exactly two antecedent formulae.
It is implicit in these cut rules that A = B and that neither A nor B is
in Γ. It may also be implicit that the cut formula C is not in Γ.
It is explicit in the surviving Stoic formulations of T3 that Γ is non-
empty. Moreover, it must be non-empty, because the second premiss must
be a Stoic sequent. It is explicit in the reconstructed formulation of T4 that
Γ is non-empty. Since—for all we know—the ancients were not familiar with
notions like the empty set, we would not expect to ﬁnd a formulation that
covers both T2 and T4.
There was also in antiquity a single Peripatetic Cut rule called the “syn-
thetic theorem”, of which Alexander of Aphrodisias (400 years after Chrysip-
pus) says that the Stoics cut it up and made of it the 2nd, 3rd and 4th
themata. Although this is historically unlikely, since, for all we know, the
early Stoics were not acquainted with Aristotle’s logic, it is true that T2,
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T3 and T4 are instances3 of this synthetic theorem:
Γ ⇒ C C,Γ′ ⇒ D
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ D Cut
S
C
Again, the actual expression was more verbal: “When from some propo-
sitions (Γ) something (C) follows, and from that which follows (C) together
with one or more propositions (Γ′) something (D) follows, then, too, from
those propositions (Γ) from which it (C) follows together with the one or
more propositions (Γ′) from which together with it (C) something (D) fol-
lows, the same thing (D) follows” [1, p. 164].4
The suﬃx C in the rule name is to emphasise the cut formula. We anno-
tate the rule name with a superﬁx S to emphasise that it is the synthetic
theorem rather than in the fuller generality of [5] or [6]. Its sequents are
Stoic: thus, Γ has size at least 2, and Γ′ has size at least 1. They may
overlap.
A more restricted version of CutS is Cut2, where the ﬁrst premiss is
constrained to have exactly two antecedent formulae.
Proposition 1.2. Every instance of Cut2 is an instance of one of T2, T3
and T4, and conversely.
Proof. Let
A,B ⇒ C C,Γ ⇒ D
A,B,Γ ⇒ D Cut
2
C
be such an instance, with A = B. This looks exactly like an instance of T3.
But what if A or B (or both) is in Γ? There are two cases:
1. Neither A nor B is in Γ: then we have an instance of T3;
2. One or both are in Γ: then we have two cases:
(a) Γ\{A,B} is empty: then we have an instance of T2;
(b) Γ\{A,B} is non-empty: then we have an instance of T4.
Conversely,
1. T2 is the instance with Γ replaced by A,B and Γ′ replaced by A, [B];
2. T3 is the instance with Γ replaced by A,B and Γ′ replaced by Γ;
3. T4 is the instance with Γ replaced by A,B and Γ′ replaced by A, [B],Γ.
3 See Corollary 1.3 below.
4 The parenthesised symbols are not in the original text; they are added, roughly as in
[1], for clarity.
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In each case restrictions such as A = B may then need to be imposed.
So it is certainly the case that T2, T3 and T4 are jointly equivalent to
Cut2. But are they jointly equivalent to CutS (i.e. with less restricted ﬁrst
premisses)? We have a partial answer:
Corollary 1.3. T2, T3 and T4 are instances of CutS.
We shall consider this question further in Section 11.
Returning to Alexander’s synthetic theorem, with it there are essentially
just two inference rules: the rules T1 and CutS . This (and its extension with
unrestricted Cut) is what we will study. The details and restrictions of T2,
T3 and T4 can be imposed without changing our main conclusions.
We present an example (to which we shall return) of a derivation, satis-
fying all the restrictions just mentioned:
Example 1.4.
p→q, p ⇒ q
¬(p ∧ q), p ⇒ ¬q
q, p ⇒ p ∧ q T1
p→q, p ⇒ p ∧ q T2
p→q, ¬(p ∧ q) ⇒ ¬p T1
¬p, ¬p→(s→r) ⇒ s→r
¬p, ¬p→s ⇒ s s, s→r ⇒ r
s→r, ¬p, ¬p→s ⇒ r T3
¬p, ¬p→s, ¬p→(s→r) ⇒ r T4
p→q, ¬p→s, ¬p→(s→r), ¬(p ∧ q) ⇒ r T3
2. Background on Hertz–Gentzen Systems
Gentzen [5], following earlier work of Hertz, introduced what we call a Hertz–
Gentzen system: sequents consist of a non-empty set Γ of formulae and a
formula A, and are written as Γ ⇒ A. Certain sequents are declared to be
initial, i.e. to be axioms. There is a rule of Thinning, which we regard as
optional; and a Cut rule, of the form
Γ ⇒ C C,Γ′ ⇒ A
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ A CutC
with the constraint (but only if Thinning is present) that C /∈ Γ′. The notion
of derivation of a sequent from the initial sequents is deﬁned as usual, with
the proviso that sequents of the form A ⇒ A are also regarded as derivable
(but useless).
A derivation can contain only subformulae of the initial sequents. So, if
the set S0 of initial sequents is ﬁnite, derivability is decidable, although a
loop-checker may be required. But, in general, if the set S0 is inﬁnite (even
just the inﬁnitely many instances of a ﬁnite set of schemata), decidability of
derivability is not at all obvious. In fact, derivability is in general undecidable
[7], by reduction of an undecidable subclass of Horn logic.
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Gentzen [5, Theorem III] showed that every derivation can be trans-
formed to a “Goclenian” normal form5: all thinnings, if any, are at the root,
and the ﬁrst premiss of every cut is an axiom and thus cut-free. Still, al-
though this can help speed up proof search, it doesn’t show decidability.
Gentzen’s proof is semantic and appears to use the ﬁniteness of the set of
axioms; but he hints at a syntactic proof, which can be done without such a
restriction. As noted by Schroeder-Heister [12], Gentzen’s result is an early
statement of the completeness of the “input strategy” for propositional res-
olution where the (ﬁnitely many) axioms and the goal sequent are Horn
formulae. See also [10]. From now on we allow no use of Thinning.
3. Limiting Proof Search in Stoic Logic
As stated above, a fundamental question about Stoic logic is its decidability.
Since the Stoics used root-ﬁrst proof search, this includes whether there is
a method for limiting the root-ﬁrst search for proofs. Note that there are
inﬁnitely many axioms, based on only a ﬁnite set of axiom schemata. One
candidate method for this limitation might be a normal form theorem, where
a derivation is normal (i.e. in normal form) iﬀ the derivation of the ﬁrst
premiss of every cut is cut-free.
An even stronger limitation for normality would be (as in Gentzen [5])
that every derivation of a cut’s ﬁrst premiss is just an axiom. But both these
approaches fail: the example given above is not normal, and we will see, in
Section 10 below, that there is no normal derivation of its end-sequent.
However, just as for Gentzen (with inﬁnitely many axioms), even a normal
form theorem would not be enough: we need (for example) analyticity.
There are several criteria that limit proof search in Stoic logic. First, every
Stoic axiom is classically valid and the rules of inference preserve classical
truth (and hence validity). So, use of a classical decision procedure may be
helpful: if a sequent is not classically valid, then it isn’t derivable by the
Stoic methods. (We call this the “classical validity criterion”.)
Second, as we will see in Sections 8 and 9, there are several other criteria,
involving a “variable-sharing property”, i.e. relevance (in the sense of [11]),
and what we call “balance”, for constraining proof search.
5 Despite its use by Schroeder, Hertz and (in a footnote) Gentzen, the adjective “Go-
clenian” seems not to have caught on for describing this kind of normal form, distinguished
from the “Aristotelian” normal form in which the axioms are, rather, at the other side of
the cut.
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Although these criteria are helpful in constraining proof search, they are
not strong enough to ensure decidability. So we consider the problem of
showing analyticity.
4. Subformulae and Occurrences
We recall the standard inductive deﬁnition that A occurs positively (i.e. with
positive polarity) in A and in A∧B and in B∧A and in B→A and negatively
(i.e. with negative polarity) in ¬A and in A→B. We deﬁne it to occur both
positively and negatively in A⊕B and in B⊕A, because of the interpretation
of A ⊕ B as “exclusive or”. This deﬁnition is extended by recursion, with
two negatives making a positive, to sub-subformulae, etc.
Since A = ¬¬A, we have that ¬A occurs (negatively) as a subformula
of A. (If this assumption isn’t allowed, nothing much changes below, except
that the presentation of the ideas becomes more complicated.)
Thus, a formula occurs positively, but not negatively, as a subformula of
itself; likewise, ¬A occurs negatively, but not positively, as a subformula of
A.
If A occurs positively (resp. negatively) as a subformula of E or negatively
(resp. positively) as a subformula of a member of Γ, then it occurs positively
(resp. negatively) in the sequent Γ ⇒ E.
We distinguish between A occurring as a member of a sequent Γ ⇒ E
and as a subformula of the sequent. For example, p occurs as a negative
subformula of the sequent p ∧ q, q ⇒ r but not as a member of the sequent
or even of its antecedent. Of course, if A occurs as a member of a sequent
then it also occurs as a subformula.
For brevity in certain parts of the exposition, we deﬁne SF(A) to be
the set of subformulae of A; SF+(A) to be the set of positively occurring
subformulae of A; SF−(A) to be the set of negatively occurring subformulae
of A; and similarly for sets and for sequents. So, p ∈ SF−(p ∧ q, q ⇒ r).
5. Character, Super-Analyticity and Analyticity
Definition 5.1. The character χ(A) of a formula A is deﬁned as follows:
χ(P ) (for atomic P ) is both positive and negative, χ(¬A) is the opposite
of χ(A) (i.e. if the latter is positive (resp. negative) then χ(¬A) is negative
(resp. positive)), χ(A∧B) is positive, χ(A→B) is negative and χ(A⊕B) is
negative. (The character is determined thus by the form of the axioms: for
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example, A→B is principal in the antecedent of some axioms but never in
the succedent.)
Thus, if χ(D) is positive, D must be either an atom, the negation of an
atom, a conjunction A ∧ B, a negated implication ¬(A → B) or a negated
disjunction ¬(A ⊕ B).
Definition 5.2.
1. A cut is super-analytic iﬀ the cut formula C occurs with polarity χ(C) as
a subformula of the cut’s conclusion. In particular, if C is either an atom
or the negation of an atom, it must occur both positively and negatively
as a subformula of the cut’s conclusion.
2. A derivation is super-analytic iﬀ every cut therein is super-analytic.
Definition 5.3.
1. A cut is analytic iﬀ the cut formula C occurs as a subformula of the cut’s
conclusion.
2. A derivation is analytic iﬀ every cut therein is analytic.
Super-analytic implies analytic. The point of analyticity is that, in root-
ﬁrst search for a derivation, a major source of non-determinism is the choice
of cut formula. If the derivation is to be analytic, one may restrict attention
to subformulae of the conclusion of the cut. This is in general more restrictive
than the subformulae of the conclusion of the derivation: some formulae may,
as we move leafwards, have disappeared. Nevertheless:
Proposition 5.4. In an analytic derivation, if a formula A occurs as a
subformula of a sequent in the derivation, then it occurs as a subformula of
the conclusion of the derivation.
Proof. By induction on the derivation structure and case analysis.
1 If the derivation is an axiom, the only sequent is already the conclusion.
2 The T1 rule leaves subformula occurrences unchanged.
3 The Cut rule provides two subcases:
(a) The occurrence is not as a subformula of the cut formula; this is routine.
(b) The occurrence is as a subformula of one of the two main occurrences
of the cut formula C; by analyticity, there is an occurrence of C as a
subformula of the conclusion. This gives us the desired occurrence of A
as a subformula of the conclusion.
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6. Examples
We present some examples using diﬀerent forms of cut formula with various
characters to illustrate the ideas about polarity and character:
Example 6.1.
¬r, (p ∧ q)→r ⇒ ¬(p ∧ q) A2 ¬(p ∧ q), q ⇒ ¬p A3
′
¬r, q, (p ∧ q)→r ⇒ ¬p Cut¬(p∧q)
p, q, (p ∧ q)→r ⇒ r T1
the cut formula is ¬(p ∧ q) (with negative character); this is a negative
subformula of p∧ q, a negative subformula of (p∧ q)→r, itself (since it is in
the antecedent) a negative member of the sequent ¬r, q, (p ∧ q)→ r ⇒ ¬p.
Three negatives makes a negative.
Example 6.2.
¬(p ∧ q), p ⇒ ¬q A3
p, q ⇒ p ∧ q T1 p ∧ q, p ∧ q→r ⇒ r A1
(p ∧ q)→r, q, p ⇒ r Cutp∧q
(p ∧ q)→r,¬r, p ⇒ ¬q T1
the cut formula is p∧q (with positive character); it is a negative subformula
of (p ∧ q)→ r, a negative member of the sequent (p ∧ q)→ r, q, p ⇒ r. Two
negatives make a positive.
Example 6.3.
p, p→(q→r) ⇒ q→r A1 q→r, q ⇒ r A1
p, p→(q→r), q ⇒ r Cutq→r
the cut formula is q→r (with negative character); it is a positive subformula
of p→ (q→r), a negative member of the sequent p, p→ (q→r), q ⇒ r. One
positive combined with a negative makes a negative.
Example 6.4.
p→p, p ⇒ p A1
p,¬p ⇒ ¬(p→p) T1 ¬(p→p),¬(p→p)→q ⇒ q A1
p,¬p,¬(p→p)→q ⇒ q Cut¬(p→p)
the cut formula is ¬(p→p) (with positive character); it is a negative subfor-
mula of ¬(p → p)→ q, a negative member of the sequent p,¬p,¬(p→ p)→
q ⇒ q. Two negatives make a positive.
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7. Main Results
We recall the ﬁve kinds of Stoic axiom from Section 1, the notions of posi-
tive and negative subformula occurrences from Section 4 and the notion of
character of a formula from Section 5.
Lemma 7.1. Let S be an axiom. Let χ(D) be positive. Suppose that D ∈
SF−(S). Then also D ∈ SF+(S).
Proof. We consider the various forms of axiom; in each subcase (other
than those ruled out) we obtain D ∈ SF+(S):
1. If the axiom is A→B,A ⇒ B, then there are four options:
(a) D is the formula A→ B; but this is ruled out by χ(D) being positive
while χ(A→B) is negative (and neither is an atom or the negation of
an atom).
(b) D occurs positively in A → B but is distinct from it: there are two
subcases: D occurs negatively in A or positively in B.
(c) D occurs positively in A: since A occurs negatively in A → B, the
formula D occurs negatively in A→B.
(d) D occurs negatively in B: since B occurs positively in A → B, the
formula D occurs negatively in A→B.
2. The case of the axiom A→B,¬B ⇒ ¬A is similar.
3. If the axiom is ¬(A ∧ B), A ⇒ ¬B, then there are four options for the
negative occurrences of D as a subformula of S:
(a) D is the formula ¬(A ∧ B): but this is ruled out since χ(D) is positive
while χ(¬(A ∧ B)) is negative (and neither is an atom or the negation
of an atom).
(b) D occurs positively in ¬(A ∧ B) but is distinct from it: so there are
two subcases: D occurs negatively in A or negatively in B (and hence
positively in ¬B).
(c) D occurs positively in A: since A occurs negatively in ¬(A ∧ B), the
formula D occurs negatively in ¬(A ∧ B).
(d) D occurs negatively in ¬B: since ¬B occurs positively in ¬(A∧B), the
formula D occurs negatively in ¬(A ∧ B).
4. The case of the axiom ¬(A ∧ B), B ⇒ ¬A is similar.
5. If the axiom is A ⊕ B,A ⇒ ¬B, then we remark that both A and B
occur both positively and negatively in A⊕B. So there are the following
options:
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(a) D is the formula A ⊕ B: but this is ruled out since χ(D) is positive
while χ(A ⊕ B) is negative (and neither is an axiom or the negation of
an axiom).
(b) D occurs positively in A ⊕ B but is distinct from it: so D occurs in A
or in B; by the remark just made, D occurs with both polarities (and
thus with negative polarity) in A ⊕ B.
(c) D occurs positively in A: by the same remark, D occurs with negative
polarity in A ⊕ B.
(d) D occurs negatively in ¬B: similar.
6. The case of the axiom A ⊕ B,A ⇒ ¬B is similar.
7. The cases of the axioms A⊕B,¬A ⇒ B and A⊕B,¬B ⇒ A are similar.
Remark 7.2. The result of the lemma does not hold of the formula D =
A ∧ B (with χ(D) positive) in the non-derivable schema
A ∧ B, A→(B→C) ⇒ C.
This illustrates that even minor tinkering with the Stoic axiom schemata,
such as adding this as an axiom schema, would upset the theory here being
developed.
Corollary 7.3. Let S be an axiom. Let χ(D) be negative. Suppose that
D ∈ SF+(S). Then also D ∈ SF−(S).
Proof. Apply the Lemma to ¬D.
We now need to discuss derivations, for which D is a good notation; so
we abandon use of D as a formula meta-variable in favour of F .





Δ′,Δ′′ ⇒ E Cut
where Δ = Δ′,Δ′′. Suppose that F occurs both negatively and positively in
C. Then F also occurs positively in E or negatively in a member of Δ.
Proof. By analyticity, C occurs as a subformula in the conclusion.
Whether it occurs positively or negatively, this implies that F occurs
positively in the conclusion, as required.
Lemma 7.5. Let D be a super-analytic derivation of S. Let χ(F ) be positive.
Suppose that F ∈ SF−(S). Then also F ∈ SF+(S).
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Proof. By induction on the derivation structure and case analysis:
1. The last step is an axiom: we use Lemma 7.1.
2. The last step is by T1: we use the induction hypothesis.





Δ′,Δ′′ ⇒ E Cut
then there are two cases:
(a) F occurs negatively in E or positively in Δ′′. By the IH on D′′, we get
either a positive occurrence in E (and we are done) or a negative one
in Δ′′ (and we are done) or a negative one in C. In the last subcase,
by the IH on D′, we get a negative one in Δ′ (and we are done) or
a positive one in C. So (unless we are done) we have both a negative
and a positive occurrence of F in C. By Lemma 7.4, we get a positive
occurrence of F in Δ′,Δ′′ ⇒ E.
(b) F occurs positively in Δ′. By the IH on D′, we get either a negative
occurrence of F in Δ′ (and we are done) or a positive occurrence of
F in C. In the last subcase, by the IH on D′′, we get a negative one
in Δ′′ (and we are done) or a positive one in E (and we are done) or
a negative one in C. So (unless we are done) we have both a positive
and a negative occurrence of F in C. By Lemma 7.4, we get a positive
occurrence of F in Δ′,Δ′′ ⇒ E.
Corollary 7.6. Let D be a super-analytic derivation of S. Let χ(F ) be
negative. Suppose that F ∈ SF+(S). Then also F ∈ SF−(S).
Proof. Apply the Lemma to ¬F .
Theorem 7.7. Every derivation is super-analytic.
Proof. By induction on the derivation structure and case analysis. Let D
be a derivation of Δ ⇒ E. There are three cases:
1. Δ ⇒ E is an axiom. D has no cut-formulae, so is certainly super-analytic.
2. D follows by T1 from D′; by the IH, the latter is super-analytic and
following it by T1 doesn’t change this.
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3. D is constructed by Cut from super-analytic derivations D′ and D′′, with





Δ′,Δ′′ ⇒ E CutC
where Δ = Δ′,Δ′′. By hypothesis, D′ and D′′ are super-analytic; so we
only need to consider the cut on C. We have to show that C occurs with
polarity χ(C) in Δ′,Δ′′ ⇒ E. Note that, if C is an atom (or an atom’s
negation), then χ(C) is both positive and negative, so the two cases that
follow are not disjoint (but they are exhaustive). There are the following
two cases:
(a) χ(C) is positive: Now, C ∈ SF−(C,Δ′′ ⇒ E). By Lemma 7.5, C ∈
SF+(C,Δ′′ ⇒ E) i.e. C ∈ SF−(C) or C ∈ SF−(Δ′′) or C ∈ SF+(E).
But C cannot have a negative subformula occurrence in C; so the oc-
currence is positive in Δ′′ ⇒ E and thus also in Δ′,Δ′′ ⇒ E.
(b) χ(C) is negative: So, χ(¬C) is positive and ¬C occurs negatively in
Δ′ ⇒ C. By Lemma 7.5, ¬C ∈ SF+(Δ′ ⇒ C) i.e. ¬C ∈ SF+(C) or
¬C ∈ SF−(Δ′). But ¬C cannot have a positive subformula occurrence
in C; so this gives us a negative occurrence of ¬C in Δ′ and hence a
negative occurrence of C in the conclusion Δ′,Δ′′ ⇒ E.
Corollary 7.8. Every derivation is analytic.
Proof. Super-analytic implies analytic.
Corollary 7.9. Stoic derivability is decidable.
Proof. The sequents in a derivation are constrained by consisting of sub-
formulae of the end-sequent, ﬁnite in number. With a loop-checker, this
ensures decidability.
By way of clariﬁcation, we add that this is a result about a system with
the Stoic axioms, the Stoic rule T1 and the unrestricted Cut rule from
Gentzen [5] (but allowing the cut formula C to belong to the rest of the
antecedent of the cut’s second premiss). Restricting the cuts by using either
what we have called CutS or the yet more restrictive rules T2, T3 and T4
does not aﬀect the argument for analyticity; it just aﬀects the choice of rules
used in the root-ﬁrst search used in the decision procedure.
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8. Atom Sharing
Definition 8.1. Consider an occurrence of an atom or negated atom in
a sequent. An occurrence thereof in a diﬀerent formula of the sequent and
with opposite polarity (w.r.t. the sequent) is said to be complementary. For
this purpose, the succedent of a sequent is regarded as a formula diﬀerent
from any of the antecedent formulae.
Lemma 8.2. If a sequent is derivable and if an atom or a negated atom
occurs therein, there is also a complementary occurrence.
Proof. By induction and case analysis.
1. Trivial for axioms.
2. Trivial for T1 steps.
3. If Γ,Γ′ ⇒ B follows by Cut from Γ ⇒ C and C,Γ′ ⇒ B, consider a
positive occurrence in Γ,Γ′ ⇒ B. There are various cases:
(a) it is a negative occurrence in Γ. So there is (by the IH on premiss
1) either a positive occurrence in a diﬀerent formula of Γ (and we are
done) or a negative occurrence in C, i.e. an occurrence in the antecedent
formula C of C,Γ′ ⇒ B and thus a positive occurrence in that sequent.
In this case (by the IH on premiss 2), there is a negative occurrence in
Γ′ ⇒ B (and we are done).
(b) it is a negative occurrence in Γ′. So there is (by the IH on premiss 2)
either a complementary occurrence in Γ′ ⇒ B (and we are done) or a
positive occurrence in C . In this case, (by the IH on premiss 1) there
is a complementary occurrence in Γ ⇒ (and we are done).6
(c) It is a positive occurrence in B. So there is (by the IH on premiss
2) a complementary occurrence either in Γ′ ⇒ (and we are done) or in
C ⇒. If in C ⇒ then (by the IH on premiss 1) there is a complementary
occurrence in Γ ⇒ (and we are done).
4. Negative occurrences are dealt with similarly.
The checking that the assertions about polarities in this are correct is
routine (but tedious). One case was done in full; the others are left for the
reader.
Corollary 8.3. If a sequent is derivable (by Axioms, T1 and Cut), and
if an atom or negated atom occurs in the succedent, then there is a comple-
mentary occurrence in the antecedent.
6 Although Γ ⇒ is not a sequent, its use indicates where the occurrence should lie.
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Proof. Trivial.
Connections with the “variable-sharing condition” for relevant logic (as
described in [11]) may now be apparent. We therefore refer to this as a “rel-
evance criterion”; in practice we ﬁnd the slightly weaker “balance criterion”
(below) as eﬀective and more convenient.
9. Balance
Definition 9.1. A sequent S is balanced iﬀ every atom occurring in S has
both a negative and a positive occurrence.
Root-ﬁrst proof search for a derivation of a sequent can be restricted to
the analysis of balanced sequents:
Proposition 9.2. Every derivable sequent S is balanced.
Proof. We present two proofs: a third will follow. First, it is an immediate
consequence of Lemma 8.2. Second, by Theorem 7.7, the derivation of S is
super-analytic. Suppose an atom occurs as a subformula of S; then its char-
acter is both positive and negative, so both Lemma 7.5 and its Corollary 7.6
apply.
But we can do better:
Definition 9.3. A sequent S is strongly balanced iﬀ every subformula D
that occurs therein has an occurrence of polarity χ(D).
Example 9.4. (p ∧ q)→r, p, q ⇒ r is strongly balanced.
Proof. Its positive subformula occurrences are
r,¬p,¬q,¬r, p ∧ q, p, q,¬((p ∧ q)→r)
and its negative ones are
¬r, p, q, r,¬(p ∧ q),¬p,¬q, (p ∧ q)→r.
Apart from atoms (which occur with both polarities, because of their hav-
ing both characters), and their negations (ditto), the subformulae here of
positive character are p ∧ q, ¬((p ∧ q)→ r) and those of negative character
are ¬(p ∧ q), (p ∧ q)→ r and it is routine to check that they do occur with
the correct polarity.
Proposition 9.5. Strongly balanced implies balanced.
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Proof. Consider an atom occurring in S. Its character is both positive and
negative; it follows that it has both a positive and a negative occurrence.
Theorem 9.6. Every derivable sequent S is strongly balanced.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 9.2. Thus, by Theorem 7.7, the
derivation of S is super-analytic. Suppose a formula D occurs as a subfor-
mula of S and its character χ(D) is positive. There are two cases:
1. Suppose that D ∈ SF−(S). By Lemma 7.5, D ∈ SF+(S), as required.
2. Otherwise, D ∈ SF+(S), again as required.
The argument if the character is negative is similar, using Corollary 7.6.
Corollary 9.7. Every derivable sequent is balanced.
Proof. (This is the promised third proof.) By Theorem 9.6 and Proposi-
tion 9.5.
These are important syntactic constraints that can be used to prune
the search, desperately needed when (in root-ﬁrst search) generating the
premisses to a cut. If one just took over all the conclusion’s formulae into
each premiss, there would be little to check; but in general one just takes
some of them.
Example 9.8. (p∧ q)∧ r,¬p,¬q ⇒ r is balanced but not strongly balanced.
So it is not derivable.
Proof. (Balanced is easy.) p ∧ q occurs just with negative polarity; but it
has positive character.
Example 9.9. p ∧ q, p→(q→r) ⇒ r is not derivable.
Proof. The sequent is not strongly balanced: consider p ∧ q.
Theorem 9.10. If the conclusion of an analytic cut is strongly balanced,
then the cut is super-analytic.
Proof. Routine.
In other words, if the only sequents we generate in root-ﬁrst proof search
are strongly balanced, and a cut formula is chosen from among the sub-
formulae of the proposed cut’s conclusion, then the cut is automatically
super-analytic.
We remark that our proofs are insensitive to details such as whether we
identify A ∧ B with B ∧ A, or whether we restrict the ﬁrst premiss of a cut
to having exactly two antecedent formulae. What we cannot do is identify
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A with the conjunction A ∧ A; the character of p ⊕ q is negative but the
character of (p ⊕ q) ∧ (p ⊕ q) is positive. Likewise, we cannot add axioms
willy-nilly; the idea from Gentzen [6] that (mutatis mutandis, i.e. using rules
rather than axioms) an introduction axiom such as A,B ⇒ A ∧ B must be
complemented by an elimination axiom such as A ∧ B,A→(B→C) ⇒ C is
unStoic and has to be suppressed.
10. Absence of a Normal Form Theorem for Stoic Logic
We illustrate the use of super-analyticity and the balance criteria in demon-
strating that there is no simple normal form theorem in Stoic logic. Recall
that a derivation is normal (i.e. in normal form) iﬀ the derivation of the ﬁrst
premiss of every cut is cut-free.
Example 1.4 was of a sequent and a derivation thereof. It is not a normal
derivation: we can now show, since all derivations are super-analytic, that
the sequent has no normal derivation. It follows that there is no normal
form theorem for Stoic logic, unless we can relax the notion of normality
somehow.
The sequent is
p→q, ¬p→s, ¬p→(s→r), ¬(p ∧ q) ⇒ r.
In addition to both positive and negative occurrences of the atoms p, q, r and
s (all of both positive and negative polarity) we have the following negative
subformula occurrences: p→q, ¬p→s, ¬p→(s→r), s→r and ¬(p ∧ q) (all
of negative polarity). We also have their negations (all of positive polarity)
as positive subformula occurrences. That is, 18 occurrences in total.
The sequent is not an axiom. Suppose it is the conclusion of a cut. If the
cut is to be Stoic, the ﬁrst premiss must be of the form A,B ⇒ C, where
A and B are in the sequent’s antecedent. For the unordered pair A,B there
are just six possibilities:
1. A = p → q, B = ¬p → s: but then C has to contain both q and s. By
super-analyticity, this can’t be done.
2. A = p→q, B = ¬p→ (s→r): but then C has to contain all of q, s and
r, which can’t be done.
3. A = p→ q, B = ¬(p ∧ q): so C has to contain p negatively and yet be
distinct from A and B. The only possibility is C = ¬p, and the derivation
given earlier illustrates one of the two ways by which this approach can
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be continued. But, note that p→ q,¬(p ∧ q) ⇒ ¬p, although derivable,
is not cut-free derivable. So, this cannot lead to a normal derivation.
4. A = ¬p → s, B = ¬p → (s → r): but then C (distinct from B) has to
contain r and ¬p, which can’t be done.
5. A = ¬p → s, B = ¬(p ∧ q): but then C has to contain q and s, which
can’t be done.
6. A = ¬p→(s→r), B = ¬(p ∧ q); a similar argument applies.
If however the sequent is the conclusion of a T1 step, similar considerations
apply: adding ¬r to the antecedent doesn’t help.
This procedure ﬁnds four derivations satisfying the Stoic criterion that
the ﬁrst premiss of a cut should have just two antecedent formulae, but there
are none where every cut has a cut-free ﬁrst premiss.
We have illustrated the use of super-analyticity and the balance criteria:
use of the classical validity criterion would have pruned the search earlier,
but hardly needs illustration. The details just given establish not just that
there is no normal derivation but that (in this case at least) the search
space for derivations can be constrained by the cuts being Stoic, by classical
validity, by super-analyticity and by balance.
11. Non-admissibility of Cut
As mentioned above, Alexander implies that the Peripatetic “synthetic the-
orem” CutS is admissible, in the system consisting of axioms, the T1 rule
and the instances (namely T2, T3 and T4) of Cut in which the ﬁrst premiss
is restricted to having exactly two antecedent formulae.
In this section we present a derivation, which uses CutS , of a sequent not
derivable in the reduced system: this refutes Alexander’s above-mentioned
implication. We maintain the restriction that all sequents are Stoic, i.e.
have at least two antecedent formulae. We use CutnA to indicate a cut, with
n antecedents in the ﬁrst premiss, on the formula A.
Example 11.1. Consider the cut
p→q, p→(q→r),¬r ⇒ ¬p ¬p,¬p→s,¬p→(s→ t) ⇒ t
p→q, p→(q→r),¬r,¬p→s,¬p→(s→ t) ⇒ t Cut
3
¬p
of which the two premisses are easily derivable using Cut2. There are several
other derivations of the conclusion using both Cut3 and Cut2. The exam-
ple uses just negation and implication: by avoiding conjunction we sidestep
suggestions about extra rules for dealing with it.
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Proposition 11.2. Every derivation of the conclusion of this example uses
Cutn for some n > 2.
Proof. To see this, consider ﬁrst of all how a derivation might end in
Cut2, using just two of the ﬁve antecedent formulae as antecedents in the
ﬁrst premiss. We consider what to take as the cut formula, maintaining
the analyticity and the balance criteria, and consider the ten cases, done in
detail to illustrate the methods and show avoidance of pitfalls:
1. p→q and p→(q→r): so the cut formula has to contain p negatively and
r positively—but, there is no suitable subformula, other than p→(q→r)
itself. But then, if we avoid looping, the other premiss can only be one
of
p→(q→r),¬p→s,¬p→(s→ t) ⇒ t
and variants of this with one of p→ q and ¬r in the antecedent; this is
unbalanced, so is not derivable.
2. p→ q and ¬r: so the cut formula has to contain p and r negatively and
q positively—but, there is no suitable subformula.
3. p→q and ¬p→s: so the cut formula has to contain q and s positively—
but, there is no suitable subformula.
4. p → q and ¬p → (s → t): so the cut formula has to contain s negatively
and q and t positively—but, there is no suitable subformula.
5. p→(q→r) and ¬r: similar to the ﬁrst case.
6. p→ (q → r) and ¬p→ s : so the cut formula has to contain q negatively
and r and s positively—but, there is no suitable subformula.
7. p→(q→r) and ¬p→(s→ t) : so the cut formula has to contain q and s
negatively and r and t positively—but, there is no suitable subformula.
8. ¬r and ¬p→s: so the cut formula has to contain r negatively and p and
s positively—but, there is no suitable subformula.
9. ¬r and ¬p→(s→ t): so the cut formula has to contain r and s negatively
and p and t positively—but, there is no suitable subformula.
10. ¬p→s and ¬p→(s→ t): similar to the ﬁrst case.
Similar arguments apply for each of the ﬁve possible premisses of a T1 step,
such as
¬t, p→(q→r),¬r,¬p→s,¬p→(s→ t) ⇒ ¬(p→q)
i.e. for each of these ﬁve possibilities we look, but in vain, for a Cut2 step
having it as conclusion.
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These results were conﬁrmed by the implementation mentioned in the
next section. The same example can, we believe, be extended to show the
inadmissibility of Cutn+1 in a system allowing use of cuts up to Cutn.
Hence
Theorem 11.3. CutS, the “synthetic theorem”, is not admissible in the
system (axioms and the four themata) of the Stoics.
Proof. Immediate,7 since each of the themata T2, T3 and T4 requires the
antecedent of the ﬁrst premiss to be of size exactly 2.
Corollary 11.4. The Cut rule of Gentzen [6] is not admissible in the
system (axioms and the four themata) of the Stoics.
Proof. Immediate: CutS is an instance of this rule.
12. A Proof Search Algorithm
Given a sequent to be decided: we execute root-ﬁrst search with, for example,
a depth-ﬁrst strategy, constrained by a loop-checker, the classical validity
check, the strong balance criterion and the analyticity criterion; we ensure
(if we choose) at each stage that the instances of Cut to be used are Stoic,
in that the ﬁrst premiss should have just two antecedent formulae. We can
also add use of the relevance criterion. Backtracking is generally required: we
don’t have the nice features of classical propositional logic. Implementation
in Prolog is straightforward (but not yet eﬃcient) [4]. It would be interesting
to try, instead, a forward search algorithm, as (for intuitionistic logic) in
Gentzen’s thesis [6].
13. Further Work
We have provided methods for limiting the search space; but we do not
change in any way the space of derivations, as can be done, for example,
in intuitionistic logic [3]. One way of doing this would be to permute some
instances of T1 upwards; but it is not yet clear that this is eﬀective in re-
ducing the derivation space. Put bluntly, there is (so far) nothing signiﬁcant
that counts as “proof theory”, in the sense of Gentzen’s programme (going
back to Hertz) of transforming proofs.
7 Pace [1, p. 166].
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14. Conclusion
We have shown that in Stoic logic (as reconstructed in [1]) all derivations
are analytic and thus the logic is decidable. By the criteria of strong analyt-
icity, strong balance, relevance and classical validity, the search space can be
limited considerably. There is no normal form theorem in Stoic logic (where
a derivation is normal if the derivation of the ﬁrst premiss of every cut is
cut-free), and neither the lightly restricted CutS rule, i.e. the “synthetic
theorem”, nor Gentzen’s Cut rule, as e.g. in [6], is admissible in the Stoic
system. We have sketched a proof search algorithm for Stoic logic.
We do not claim that the Stoics knew or suspected any of this meta-
theory. On the other hand, we do not rule out that they may have developed
their own approximations to some of these results.
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